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RECENT CASES
ADOPTION-INIIErANCE FROM ADOPTIVE PARENTS. In 1923, appellant, at
the age of nineteen months, was adopted by A and wife. Later, when ap-
pellant was four and a half years old, A and wife consented to her adoption
by B and wife. A died intestate in 1936. As wife died in 1941 leaving
appellant one dollar in her will. Appellant claims a right to inherit as an
heir from A. Held: a child adopted for the second time can inherit from
its first adoptive parents. In re Egley's Estate, 116 Wash. Dec. 594, 134 P.
(2d) 943 (1943).
The cases throughout the country dealing with this precise subject
are few, but the Washington court in the principal case seems in line
with tthe majority rule. Holmes v. Curl, 189 Iowa 246, 178 X. W. 406
(1920); Dreyer v. Schrick, 105 Kans. 495, 185 Pac. 30 (1919); Villier v. Wat-
qon, 168 Ky. 631, 182 S. W. 869, L..R. A. 1918A 820 (1916).
The theory of the decisions in the majority cases rests partly on such
statutes as REm. REv. STATS. §§ 1699 and 1341, making an adopted child to
all intents and purposes the natural child and heir of the adoptive
parents, and partly on the general rule that an adopted child can inherit
from its natural parents. This last mentioned rule is the weight of
authority in most jurisdictions including Washington. In re Roderick's
Estate, 158 Wash. 377, 291 Pac. 325 (1930); Roberts v. Roberts, 160 Minn.
140, 199 N. W. 581 (1924); annotation, 132 A. L. R. 773 (1941). The. court
in the Roderick case, supra, said, "where a natural parent does not
name or provide in.his will for a natural child, who has been adopted
by others, that as to that child the parent is deemed to have died intestate,
and the child does not lose by adoption the right to inherit from its
natural parent."
Relring on the efforts of the adoption statute to place the adopted
child in the position of a natural child, and on the rule in the Roderick
case, zppra, ,the cases have almost universally held that a child adopted for
the second time can inherit from its first adoptive parents when such par-
ents have predeceased the second adoption. In re Sutton, 161 Minn. 426,
201 N. W. 925 (1925); Patterson v. Browning, 146 Ind. 160, 44 N. E. 993
(1896); Russell v. Russell, 14 Ky. Law Rep. 236 (1892); In re Talley, 188
Okla. 138, 109 P. (2d) 495, 132 A. L. R. 773 (1941). The reasoning here
seems clear enough, since by the adoption statutes in these cases the right
of an adopted child to inherit vests on the death of his adopted parent in
the same manner as it does in ,the case of a natural child. Cases deciding
this phase of the question, however, have been applied by some courts
(including the majority in the principal case) when they are confronted
with the Egley situation. There seems to be a clear distinction between
the cases, however, based on whether the first adoptive parents died before
or after the time of the second adoption.
Notwithstanding the above mentioned confusion, the theories of the
decisions on either side of the question contained in the principal case are
clear enough. Four cases: In re Egley, supra; Holmes v. Curl, supra; Dreyer
v. Schrick, supra; and Villier v. Watson, supra, form the majority. Two
cases: In re Talley, supra; and In re Klapp, 197 Mich. 615, 164 N. W. 381,
L. R. A. 1918A 818, form the minority. The construction that the majority
decisions giye to the similar adoption statutes seems the most logical.
By express provisions, the adoption statutes of all the states in which the
question has been considered have placed the adopted child, as to in-
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heritance, in the same position as that of a natural child. If the courts
are to be consistent with the holding in the Roderick case, supra, that
an adopted child can still inherit as the legal heir of its natural parents,
it appears only reasonable that the courts must hold that a child adopted
for the second time can still inherit as the legal heir of its first adoptive
parents. The adoption statutes merely add a new capacity to inherit; they
say nothing about cutting off capacity to inherit through a right already
acquired.
The cases forming the minority, In re Klapp, supra, and In re Talley,
supra, as well as the dissenting opinion in the Egley case, are unwilling
to go beyond the Roderick rule. They attempt to distinguish the cases
permitting an adopted child to inherit from its natural parents from
the situation in the present case by asserting a difference between a right
given by blood and that given by statute. The reasoning of the minority
seems to be that when a child is born, its right to inherit as a natural
child is then vested; but the right of an adopted child is only a statutory
right, and the statute should not apply when there has been a second
adoption. See 16 Notre Dame Lawyer 240 (1942), for a note agreeing with
this view. It is again submitted, however, that the minority argument does
not take into account such statutes as REM. REV. STATS. §§ 1699 and 1341,
which place an adopted child in the same status as that of a natural,
legal heir.
Although the rule of the Egley case may be a logical conclusion based
on the statutes and past decisions, such a policy can greatly confuse the
settlement of estates. Children adopted for the second or third -time
may not only inherit from their natural parents and kin, and as the
natural children of any of their adoptive parents, but also from collateral
kin of those parents who may never have heard of this child.
It is submitted that the problem can best be corrected by the legislature.
An enactment making the child the legal heir of the parents, natural or
adoptive, who then have the exclusive legal custody of it would seem best.
After all, if adoption severs all other obligations and duties owed to, or
placed upon, the former parent, why should not the right of -the child to
be an heir of the former parent be severed?
F. L.
LEASE--STATUTE OF FRAUDS-IMPROVEMENTS. Plaintiffs instituted an
action to reform a five-year lease of real property which was defective
since not acknowledged by the lessor as required by REM. REV. STAT.
§ 10551. P entered under the lease, paid two years rent at $25 per year,
constructed buildings costing $1,225, repaired a road and put in water
pipe for $100, and bought machinery for $400. Defendant, having given
notice, contends the rights of P were terminated at the end of the second
year. The lease contained a provision for removal of buildings constructed
by the lessee at successful termination of the lease. P also testified during
the trial that the buildings remained his property and other improvements
were solely for his own benefit. Held: P is entitled to enforcement of
the lease. If the acts of one of the parties to a lease have so changed his
situation that he cannot be placed in his original position, a court of
equity will enforce the lease even though void under the Statute of Frauds.
Garbrick et at. v. Franz et al., 13 Wn. (2d) 427, 125 P. (2d) 295 (1942).
The majority rule seems to be that an oral lease within the Statute
of Frauds can be enforced in equity if the lessee has made improvements
on the premises. Tiffany, REAL PROPERTY, 3rd ed., § 83, citing Matzger v.
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Arcade Building and Realty Co., 80 Wash. 401, 141 Pac. 900, L. R. A. 1915A,
288 (1914). Although some courts have allowed -the mere taking of
possession, or possession and payment of rent to take the lease out of the
Statute, and the RESTATEMENT OF CONRACTS, § 197, takes this view as to
contracts to transfer an interest in land, these are in the minority and
according to Tiffany, supra, "most questionable".
The Washington court has definitely followed the majority rule. There
have been a good number of local cases covering the various aspects of the
problem as to what improvements will, or will not, take a lease out of
the Statute of Frauds. These cases seem to present four distinct rules
although some cases involve more than one. First, Matzger v. Arcade
Building and Realty Co., supra, seems chiefly to establish the rule that the
giving of part of the consideration for the entire term such as improve-
ments or payments required by the lessor, aside from the rent, will take
a lease out of the Statute. Second, improvements not required by ,the
lessor, but of benefit to him are sufficient to take a lease out of the
Statute. McGlauflin v. Holman, 1 Wash. 239, 24 Pac. 439 (1890), Lauten-
schlager v. Smith, 155 Wash. 328, 284 Pac. 87 (1930), Lamken v. Miller,
181 Wash. 544, 44 P. (2d) 190 (1935). Third, improvements required by,
or undertaken solely for, the lessee will estop him from setting up the
Statute of Frauds as a defense. Forrester v. Reliable Transfer Co., 59
Wash. 86, 109 Pac. 312, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 1093 (1910), Rowland v. Cook, 179
Wash. 624, 38 P. (2d) 224, 101 A. L. R. 180 (1934). And fourth, improvements
by the lessee for his own benefit only, relying on the lease, are not
sufficient to enable him to enforce it if the Statute has not been satisfied.
Armstrong v. Burkett, 104 Wash. 476, 177 Pac. 333 (1918).
In the instant case the lessee made expenditures solely for his own
benefit, which were contemplated at the time of making the lease, but
not required by it. The reservation in the lease of the right ito remove
any buildings constructed by the lessee, together with his agreement to
pay taxes thereon, seem to establish both his ownership and right to remove
them when given notice of the termination of his tenancy. That such an
agreement is valid is well established. Tiffany, REAL PROPERTY, 3rd ed.,
§§ 612 and 617. This fact, as well as the testimony of the lessee that all
of the improvements were for his own benefit, indicates that there was
no benefit to the lessor from them, nor any consideration going to the
entire term. This places the instant case in the fourth category above
along with Armstrong v. Burkett, supra.
Although the court states that there is some conflict between the
Matzger rule and that of the Armstrong case, the former was clearly and
properly distinguished in the Armstrong decision itself. There the
lessee had made substantial alterations in the premises and expenditures
on wall cabinets, and purchased goods for the Christmas trade in
reliance on an oral lease, but 'the court held that these things were not
sufficient to take the lease out of the Statute of Frauds. Also in Watkins
v. Balch, 41 Wash. 310, 83 Pac. 321 (1906), the court held that $300 worth
of permanent improvements by the lessee under an oral lease during three
years of tenancy was not sufficient to take the case out of the Statute in
the absence of clear proof of increase in rental value or material injury
to the lessee. While ,the facts differ somewhat from the instant case the
the holding at least indicates that the lessee here should have proved
beyond mere inference what his loss would be after sale or removal of
his property, and that it should be a substantial injury.
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From -this analysis it seems clear that the cases supporting the first,
second, and third rules, above set out, are clearly distinguishable although
the court in the instant case seems to rely on all -three to support its
decision. The fourth rule should apply unless the size of -the expenditure
is enough to distinguish this case from Almstrong v. Burkett, supra, but
the loss to the lessee here should be limited to that which he has proved
would accrue to him as a result of the removal of his buildings in
determining his change of position.
The court in the instant case says the test is whether the acts of one
of the parties have changed his situation to such an extent that he cannot
be adequately compensated in damages or placed in his original position.
Although the language of the court and the facts of the case imply the
overruling of the Armstrong decision, the apparent reliance on the
Matzger case and others which are clearly distinguishable therefrom casts
some doubt on the present status of the law.
C. G. F., Jr.
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